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The Nuclear Suppliers  Group (NSG) held its annual  plenary session in  Seattle on 21-22 June 2012. As in the previous two
plenary meetings, the issue of Indian membership to the NSG and  the Pakistani-Chinese  claim of supply of two additional
nuclear power reactors to Pakistan (Chasma-III and IV) under the ambit of the 1991 bilateral agreement came up for discussion.
However, given the internal differences, the NSG was unable to reach a consensus on either issue. This is not unusual as the
decision that the NSG takes on both issues will have great bearing on its future course.
Following the June 2012 plenary meeting, two articles authored by former Pakistani diplomats - Asif Ezdi and Maleeha Lodhi -
appeared in the Pakistani  newspaper, The News, which described the issues as  being “two sides of the same coin.” National
interest seems to have inflicted the Pakistani diplomats with selective amnesia. One could argue - like the Pakistani diplomats do
– that the US decision to offer the nuclear deal to India was driven by strategic concerns.
However, it would be prudent to remember that despite American backing, the deal would not have gone through, but for India’s
clean non-proliferation record. In a June 2011 interview to Der Speigel, AQ Khan clearly stated that the Pakistan Army knew of
his nuclear ‘Wal Mart’, thereby depriving Islamabad of the ‘fig leaf’ of an arguement that it remained in the dark about the Khan
proliferation network. Thus, despite Islamabad crying hoarse, its proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to Iran, North
Korea  and  Libya will  come in  the way  of  its  efforts  of  securing  a similar deal. What  the Pakistani  authors  bemoan is  the
de-hyphenation of India and Pakistan by the United States, which the Indo-US nuclear deal signifies.
While the issue of India’s membership of the NSG can be seen as the next logical step, and has received support from the US,
France, Russia among others, the Chinese-Pakistani claim of ‘grandfathering’ the supply of Chasma-III and IV is a much more
complex issue.
This claim is based on the bilateral agreement signed between China and Pakistan in 1991. However, when China joined the NSG
in 2004, it had pledged not to supply any additional nuclear technology to Pakistan other than what had already been committed.
At  that time, China had disclosed that the ‘grandfather’  clause would apply only to life-time support and fuel supply for the
safeguarded Chasma-I  and II  nuclear power plants, supply of heavy water and operational  safety service to the safeguarded
Karachi nuclear power plant, and the supply of fuel and operational safety services to the two safeguarded research reactors at
PINSTECH. This Chinese assertion was publicly reiterated by the then US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice in April 2006.
Thus, the Chinese claim - made public in early 2010 – of ‘grandfathering’ Chasma-III and IV contravenes its earlier commitment
made to the NSG. Under the current NSG guidelines, Pakistan being a state outside the NPT would have to commit to place all its
current  and  future  nuclear  facilities  under  safeguards  (full-scope  safeguards)  as  a  condition  for  the  supply.  The  claim  of
grandfathering the transfer of nuclear reactors is can be seen as an attempt to sidestep this requirement.
The problem with this claim is two-fold. Firstly, the claim of grandfathering cannot be used in perpetuity. China cannot keep
expanding the scope of cooperation which it had listed out in 2004. Secondly, in 2006, the group agreed by consensus that any
future claim made by a member that  specific  exports should be considered under the grandfather clause would have to be
backed  up  with  documentary evidence, such as  commercial  contracts  with  agencies  in  the recipient  state. The demand  for
clarifications from Beijing by the NSG members should be seen in this context.
As Mark Hibbs states, Beijing  in mid-2011 informed the NSG that  in 2004 it had appraised the IAEA of its  intended future
exports of nuclear reactors to Pakistan as part of an expanded declaration of its nuclear activities under the Additional Protocol.
This claim cannot be verified because communication between the IAEA and the member states regarding the implementation of
the Additional Protocol are confidential.
Thus, the NSG is faced with a Hobson’s choice. It can either choose to let the current Chinese-Pakistani claim be, in the hope
that  it  would  not  be repeated  in the future. However, as reports  indicate, plans  already seem afoot  for the transfer of two
additional nuclear power reactors at Karachi by China. If China claims - as is suspected it will - that these too are grandfathered
under the ambit of the 1991 agreement, Beijing would in essence be throwing down the gauntlet to the NSG. Beijing could be
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doing this as it possibly believes that the groups’ members would not like to push it  to the brink, as it would only harm the
NSG’s credibility. However, it is possible that since adherence to NSG Guidelines are voluntary, China is trying to test how far it
can go before reaching break-point. In any case, the NSG will have to confront the challenge posed by Beijing’s supply of power
reactors to Pakistan, especially since it is inconsistent with China’s past commitments to the NSG.
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